RECENT CASES.
BILLS AND NOTEs-BoNA FIDe
OF CoRPoRATIO

HOLDR-CoNsTRVCTIVE

NOTICE TO AGENT

.- The defendant made his promissory 'note to the order of

the X corporation in payment for stock purchased by him. The sale of the
stock had been induced by the fraudulent representation of the X Company's
agent. The X corporation negotiated the note to the plaintiff, its vicepresident and one its directors. Held: the plaintiff can recover. Dodo v.
Stocker, 219 Pac. 222 (Colo. I923).
The court based its decision on the ground that the plaintiff was a
bona fide holder for value before maturity without notice of any defense.
good against the payee. The question involved in the case is whether the
fraud of the agent of the corporation in making false representations, imputed by law to the corporation, gave the plaintiff, an officer-of that corporation; constructive notice or knowledge of the defense.
While the N. I. L does not mention constructive notice it has been
held that section 56 codifies the common law as to notice, and knowledge.
Arnd v. Aylesworth, 145 Iowa 185, 123 N. W. iooo (i9o9); and that constructive notice was not removed from the law of negotiable instruments by
the failure to mention it expressly in the uniform act. Kipp v. Smith, 137
Wis. 234, i18 N. W. 484 (1908); Empire State Surety Co.' v. Nelson, 148
App. Div. 85o, 126 N. Y. S. 453 (i910); Paika v. Perry, 225 Mass. 563,
ii4 N. E. 830 (1917).
Unquestionably the knowledge of the agent who acted fraudulently
was imputed to his principal, the X corporation. Bluthenthal v. Beckhart,
175 Ala. 398, 57 So. 814 (1912). The question then is whether this knowledge is further imputed to another agent of the corporation; i. e., the plaintiff who was vice-president and a director and who received the note from
the corporation. In other words, is an officer of a corporation deemed to
have knowledge of the latter's fraudulent act?
Section 56 of the N. I. L provides that "to constitute notice of an
infirmity . . . the person to whom it [a negotiable instrument] is negotiated must have . . . knowledge . . ." This confused use of the words
"notice" and "knowledge" in the act would make the case more difficult Were
it not for the decision mentioned .upra to the effect that the act codifies
the common law. The decision adopted in the instant case that an officer
of a corporation is not chargeable with the knowledge of the corporation
was reached in King v. Doane, 139 U. S. 166 (i8go) ; -Washburn v. Intermountain Co., 56 Ore. 578, 19 Pac 382 (1912); Pitman v. Walker, 187 CaL
667, 2o3 Pac. 739 (1922). The opposite conclusion was reached in McCarty
v. Kepreta, 24 N. D. 395, 139 N. W. mg2 (1913); Hardin v. Dale, 45 Okla.
694, 146 Pac. 77 (1915). This latter view cannot be supported on law or
logic.
BILLS AND NOTES-CRTAINTY OF PAYE.-Suit by first transferee against
accommodation makers on a promissory note payable "to the order of the
bearer." Held: the instrument is a negotiable promissory note payable to
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order, under the N. I. L. American National Bank . Kerlcy,

(Ore.

220

Pac.

125

1923).

At common law it was required that the payee of an order bill or noie
he specified in the instrument, or so designated that he was ascertainable
at the time of execution. Daniel, Neg. Instr., Sec. oim; Ogden, Neg. Instr.,
Sec. 52; Storm v. Stirling, 3 Ellis & B. 832 (Eng. 1854). The N. I. . provides that "The instrument is payable to order where it is drawn payable tot
the order of a specified person -or to him or his order. . . . Where the instrument is payable to order the payee must be named or otherwise indicated
therein with reasonable certainty"; 'Sec. 7800, Or. L.; N. I. L Sec. 8; and the
principal case construes this certainty to mean certainty at the time of execution and holds "bearer" to be such a specification as the statute requires,
since on the facts "bearer" was intended to be a dcscriptio personaeof the first
bearer, presumably the plaintiff.
This intention Would be relevant in determining who is entitled, to sue,
but does not seem so in passing on the sufficiency of the instrument itself.
Inasmuch as "bearer" commonly indicates not only the first, but any bearer
in the course of transfer, it would seem that the payee is not indicated in
the instrument, at the time of execution, with reasonable certainty.
Courts will make every effort to hold a bill or note negotiable. In a case
where recovery was granted to the indorsee of a note payable "to the order
of the person who should thereafter endorse," the court in some perplexity,
called it both a limited form of bearer note and an enlarged form of order
note, and said: "If it could have effect in no other way. we should hold it
payable to bearer generally" U. S. v. White, 2 Hill 59 (N. Y. i84T).
It is suggested that the court could have indulged this tendency, in the
instant case, with less strain on well settled principles by holding the note
payable to bearer. An instrument payable to the order of A is equivalent to
one payable to A or order; Frederick v. Cotton, 2 Show. 8 (Eng. 1678);
Durgin v. Bartol, 64 Me. 473 (1874); Huling v. Hugg, i Watts & S. 418
(Pa. 1841). By analogy a note payable to the order of the bearer would
be payable to the bearer or order, which is clearly negotiable. Allen v.
O'Donald, 28 Fed. 17 (I886).
BILLS

AND

NOTES-CERTIFIED

CHECK-DAwER's

RIGHT To

STOP

PAY-

mET.-Plaintiff drew a check on the defendant bank and had the bank certify it before delivering it to the payee. The bank subsequently, ignoring
the plaintiff's order to withhold payment, cashed it for the payee. At the
trial, the plaintiff failed to prove facts which would have constituted a good
defense against the payee in an action for stopping payment. Held: no recovery. Sutfer v. Security Trust Co., 122 Atl. 381 (N. J. 1923).
The cour stated that, had the plaintiff established that he has a good
defense against the payee, he would have recovered from the defendant
bank for the payment contrary to his order, the check having been certified at his request before the payee received it.
"Section 187 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides that certification of a check "by the bank on which it is drawn is equivalent to an
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acceptance." If the certification is so considered in this case, the plaintiff's
defense of fraud on the part of the payee would protect the acceptorin this case the bank-in an action by the payee on the check and therefcre the bank would be required to withhold payment as ordered. Ogden,
Negotiable Instruments, sec. 143; 8 C. J. 78o; Negotiable Instruments Law,
sec. 55. But in the case of a check, a demand for payment without certification is the drawer's normal expectation, and the cases have treated a
certification obtained by the payee as though the payee had received payment, and then redeposited the funds with the bank in his own name, taking a certificate of deposit, and thereby terminating the drawer's connection
with instrument. See Daniel, Negotiable Instruments, sec. 16o3; Bank of
Jersey City v. Leach, 52 N. Y. 350 (1873); Jones v. Bank of North Hudson, 95 N. J.L 376, 113 Ati. o2 (i92) ; Mechanics Bank v. Smeltz Bank,
116 S. E. 380 (Va. 1923). On this reasoning, sec. i6ol a, states that the
effect of certification is (I)to make the bank the principal and only debtor,
(2) to release the drawer of his liability, and (3)to make the check circulate as money.
However, the cases distinguish between the situation above in which the
payee obtains the certification and that in which the drawer obtains it before
delivery to the payee. In the latter case the certification is not treated as
a redeposit by the payee releasing the drawer; the drawer is still liable to
the payee of the check. Bickford v. Bank, 42 Ill. 238 (I866) ; Minot v. Russ,
156 Mass. 46o, 31 N. E. 489; Olsen v. Trust Co, 2o5 N. Y. App. Div. 513,
19 N. Y. S. 700 (1923). See also 26 H&Rnv. L. REv. 365, denying the reason
for this distinction, though codified by sec. i88 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law.
Following out this distinction, the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated
in dictum, since the passage of the Negotiable Instruments Law, where the
drawer retains his liability on the check, both he and the bank can set up
the defense attempted in the principal case. Times Square Co. v. Rutherford Bank, 77. N. J.L 649, 73 Atl. 479 (i9o9). Apparently this exact situation has not been met -elsewhere, though in Blake v. Hamilton Dime Bank,
79 Ohio 189, 87 N. E. 73 (igog), where the certification had been at the
request of the payee, the payee was not permitted to stop payment to his
indorsee. It is submitted that the New Jersey rule is the logical result of
the distinction in regard to the discharge of the drawer. It is to be noted
that sec. 187 of the Negotiable Instrument Law specifically refers to certification procured by the holder and does not apply to the principal case,
but its statement is that the certification releases the drawer and indorsee,
and it does not say that the check shall pass as money or indicate that the
person procuring the certification loses his defenses against his immediate
transferee.
BILLs AND NoTms-Dmaw-aY-P.AoL EvmNcm-The payee of a promissory note sued- the defendant 'as co-maker. The defendant offered to
prove by parol that he signed only as a witness to the signatures of the
other makers and that the plaintiff took the note with this knowledge. Held:
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evidence excluded. International Harvester Co. v. Beverland, 219 Pac. 2o1
(Idaho 1923).
Clearly, parol evidence is not admissible to vary the terms of a bill
or note. Daniel, Negotiable Instruments (6th edition), sec. So. Thus, even
as between immediate parties, evidence cannot be admitted of an agreement
to vary the date of maturity of a note; Woodbridge v. Spooner, 3 B. & Ald.
-.33 (Eng. i8ig) ; Getto v. Binkert, 55 Kan. 617, 40 Pac. 925 (1895) ; or to
show that the liability of a party to an instrument would not be enforced;
maker, Earle v. Enos, 130 Fed. 467 (19o4); drawer, Cummings v. Kent, 44
Ohio 92, 4 N. E. 7Io (1886); indorser. Nickell v. Bradshaw, 94 Ore. 580.
183 Pac. 72 (igg) ; contra, maker, Monroe v. Martin, 137 Ga. 262, 73 S. E.
and see O'Brien v. Paterson Brewing Co., 69 N. J. E. 117, 6i
341 (igi);
Atl. 437 (19o5), and Sykes v. Everett, 167 N. C. 6oo, 83 S. E. 585 (1914);
or that the note was to be paid out of a particular fund; Mumford v. Tolman, 157 I1. 258, 41 N. E. 617 (i895), but see Keller v. Cohen, 217 Pa.
522, 66 Ati. 862 (19o7); or that the liability of an indorser was to be that
of a guarantor; Howe v. Merrill, 5 Cush. So (Mass. 1849); Fuller v. McDonald, 8 Greenl. 213 (Maine 1832); contra, Taylor v. French, 2 Lea. 257
(Tenn. 1879); or a surety; Barbard v. Gaslin, 23 Minn. i94 (1876); or a
maker; Finley v. Green, 85 Ill. 536 (1877).
But evidence to show that an instrument which purports to be a contract is in fact no contract at all is admissible as between original parties
or those taking with notice. The question is always 'whether the instrument was delivered to take effecf as a binding obligation in the form in
which it exists. Pyr. v. Campbell, 6 El. & BI. 370 (Eng. 1856); Storey
v. Storey, 214 Fed. 973, 131 C. C. A. 269 (1914).
Thus, proof that the delivery to the payee of a note unconditional
upon its face was conditional and that the condition never occurred is
admissible against one not having the rights of a holder in due course.
Burke v. Dulaney, 153 U. S. 228 (1893); McFarland v. Sikes, 54 Conn.
250. 7 At. 408 (1886); Negotiable Instruments Law, sec. 16; contra, Jones
v. Shaw, 67 Mo. 667 (1878). One may show that a note in the hands of an
immediate party or one taking with notice was given merely as a
receipt or memorandum of advancements made by the payee to the
maker, neither party intending the note to be binding as such; Storey v.
Storey, supra; Brook v. Latimer, 44 Kan. 43r, 24 Pac. 946 (189o); Bond
v. Vandergrift, 128 N.'Y. S. lo78 (1911); contra, Weaver v. Fries, 85 Ill.
356 (1877); Billings v. Billings, 1o Cush. 178 (Mass. 1852) ; Dickson v. Harris, 6o Iowa 72/, 13 N. W. 335 (1883) ; or that it was given to a bank merely
to avoid trouble with the banking commissioner; Kennett Square National
Bank v. Shaw, 218 Pa. 612, '67/ AtI. 875 .(19o7); or simply to show the
payee's interest in certain land, and not to be evidence of any indebtedness
on the part of the maker. Davis v. Stems, 85 Neb. 121, I22 N. W. 672
(igog); contra, Chapman v. Chapman, 132 Iowa 5, IO9 N. W. 3o0 (i9o"6).
In the principal case the defendant did not seek to vary the terms of
the note by showing that his liability was different from that contained in
the instrument; he sought to prove that he was not liable upon it at all; that
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the note had never been delivered to the plaintiff to take effect as a contract. Upon this view, the evidence should have been admitted. In Thompson v. Wilkinson, 9 Ga. App. 367, 7T S. E. 678 (igi), upon facts identical with those of the instant case, the evidence was properly held admissible. There is a dictum to the same effect in Palmer v. Stephens, I Denio
471 (N. Y. x845).
The court in the instant case in reaching its decision relies upon Stack
v. Beach, 74 Ind. 571 (i88i), and Alabama National Bank v. Rivers,
r16 Ala. i, 22 So. 580 (1897), which hold that one who writes
his name, apparently as an indorser, under that of the payee, is not permitted to show by parol that he signed merely to identify the payee, and
that the plaintiff took the note with this knowledge. To the came effect is
Prescott Bank v. Caverly, 7 Gray 217 (Mass. 1856). It is submitted that
these cases were wrongly decided, and that the evidence in them, as in the
instant case, should have been admitted.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--TAXATIoN-ExEMPTION FROM STATE TAXATION.
-Clallam County levied a tax upon land and other physical property situate within its borders belonging to the United States Spruce Production
Corporation, incorporated under the laws of the State of Washington. The
United States, having organized the corporation for war purposes, was the
sole stockholder, received all the profit, and conveyed to the corporation the
property sought to be taxed. Held: The tax is unconstitutional. McClallain
County, Washington, William A. Nelson, Sleriff of Clallam County et al.
v. The United States of America and United States Spruce, Production
Corporation, U. S. S. C. Advance Sheets, No. 255, October Term, 1923.
In M'Culloch v. The State of Maryland et al., 4 Wheat 316 (i8i9),
Chief Justice Marshall laid down the rule that a state could not tax the
means employed by Congress to carry into execution powers conferred upon
it by the Constitution of the United States. It has been held that a state
cannot tax a national bank, or its shares of stock, unless Congress has given
assent to such taxation. Rosenblatt v. Johnston, 1o4 U. S. 462 (1881) ; Mercantile Bank v. New York, 121 U. S. 138 (1887) ; Owensboro National Bank
v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 664- (899).
Although a state cannot tax the means
of the Federal Government, Chief Justice Chase, in upholding a state tax on
the land of a railroad company incorporated by the state, but the capital for
which was supplied by the United States, said that taxation of the property
of the government agency was not generally%taxation of the means itself.
Thomson v. Pacific Railroad, 9 Wall. 579 (1869). Federal realty cannot be
taxed by a state. Van Brocklin &c another v. Tennessee et al., 117 U. S. 151
(1886); Wisconsin Central Railroad v. Price County, 133 U. S. 496 (1889).
It has been decided in a district court and .a .circuit court of appeals that
a tax on the property of the Emergency Fleet Corporation. is a tax on the
property of the United States. United States, V. Coghlan et al., 261 Fed. 425
(D. C. pip9); King -County, Wash. el al. v. United States Shipping Board
Emergency Fleet Corporation, 282 Fed. 950 (C. C. A.'i922). A district court
has held that the.realty of the Spruce Production Corporation is not subject
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to state taxation. United States Spruce Production Corporation v. Lincoln
County et at., 285 Fed. 388 (D. C. 19-). The test which determines
whether a state can tax is the effect of the tax and the tax in the principal
case would seem to hinder the efficient exercise of governmental powers.
Railroad Company v. Peniston 18 Wall. 5 (1873). -Again, on looking behind
the corporate entity it will be seen that the corporation held only a naked
title; that the United States owned all the stock, received all the profit, and
used the corporation as an instrument for producing a weapon of war. As
to the right to look behind the corporate entity, see 72 U. or PA. L. REv. 158
(1924).

CONTRACTS-OFFER

AND ACCEPTANCE-RULES GOVERNING-THE

CONSTRUC-

TION OF THE ACCEPTANCE.-The plaintiff wrote to the defendant, offering to
buy goods. The defendant's answer materially altered the terms of sale.
The plaintiff replied: "We have for acknowledgment yours of the 9th inst.,
all of which is in order." The defendant subsequently sold the goods elsewhere. The plaintiff sued for failure to deliver. Held: No contract existed. Coastw4se Lumber Co. v. Slitzingcr, 81 Pa. Super. 554 (1923).
In the principal case, the defcndant's letter was a counter-offer, which
required an acceptance in order to become a binding contract. The court
states that the defendant "was entitled to an acceptance -which it in fact
understood, or by the custom of its trade was required to understand, to
The dissenting opinion maintains that the plaintiff's
be an acceptance."
letter was a good acceptance, taking the broader view that an offeror is
entitled only to an acceptance stated in terms which are reasonably clear
and sufficiently plain to be understood by a person of ordinary intelligence
who is acquainted with all the circumstances.
In many cases where the question has been whether a series of letters
constitute a contract, the courts have not elaborated the reasons for their
decisions. Where any rules have been laid down, it has usually been required that the acceptance be positive, absolute, unequivocal and unambigui Williston, Contracts (192o), 127; Dougherty v. Briggs, 231 Pa.
ous.
68, 79 AtL. 924 (1911) ; Chapin v. Cherry, 243 Mo. 375, 147 S. W. 1o84 (1912) ;
Shaw v. Hackbarth, =2 Ore. So, 2oi Pac. io66 (i92I). What test is to
determine whether the particular phrasis come within these requirements is seldom stated. The general rules that a letter is construed most
strongly against the writer, Star-Chronicle Publishing Co. v. New York
Evening Post, 256 Fed. 435, 167 C. C. A. 563 (1919), and that the words
of the speaket are to be interpreted as the person addressed will understand them, Pocket v. Almon, 9o Vt. io, 96 Atl. 421 (I915), are frequently
mentioned.
The cases show that the construction which an offeror gives to an
acceptance does not necessarily govern. His failure to treat an actual acceptance as such in no way defeats ii1s obligation on the contract, Ozzola v.
Musolino, 225 Mass. 51.2, 114 N. E. 733 (1917); nor can he,, by believing
himself to be bound, impose any liability on an offeree who has-not in fact

I -1

' RECENT CASES'

323

-accepted. Potts v. WIhitehead,

23 N. J. Eq. 5T2 (972) ; Dunning v. Thomas,
Colo. 84, r4 Pac. 49 (18,7). Likewise, his own offer will be interpreted
according to his expressed, not his undisclosed, intent. Harris v. Amoskeag
Lumber Co., 97 Ga. 465, 25 S. E. 5Sg (1895) ; Pocket v. Ahnon, supra.
In some cases, the results reached under the two views laid down in
the principal case will be the same. Words which, by the custom of its
trade, the defendant is required to understand as an acceptance will be given
a similar construction by a person of ordinary intelligence acquainted with
all the circumstances. But where no trade usage exists, the offeror may
not in fact understand the words of the offeree to be an acceptance, when
a person of ordinary intelligence would so understand them. In such a situation, the broader rule laid down by the dissenting justice seems to be
the better, and, as the cases show, the one more frequently followed. Manier
& Co. v. Appling. 112 Ala. 663. 20 So. 978 (x896'); Bauman v. McManus,
75 Kan. io6, 89 Pac. i5 (i9o7); Courtney Shoe Co. v. Curd, 142 Ky. 219,
134 S. W. 146 (igii).

TO

CONVICTS-CIVIL DEATH-AILITY

TO

INIERIT

AND

POWER TO

CONVEY

DCRINc, INCARCERATON.-A statute provided that "a person sentenced to life
imprisonment is thereby deemed civilly dead." X, who was serving a life
term, became next of kin under a certain intestacy. He conveyed the property to the defendant. The plaintiff now sues to have the conveyance set
aside. Held: The statute did not impair a criminal's right to inherit and
convey property. Grooms v. Thomas, 219 Pac. 700 (Okla. 1gz4).
At common law the incident of "civil death" attcnded every attainder of
treason or felony, the person convicted being regarded as "dead in the law,"
Y Crutty, Criminal Law -2.1, but as a general rule civil death did not of
itself divest the offender of his lands. Nichols v. Nichols. Plowd. 477
(Eng. 17(2). Hle could devise them subject inly to the right of entry for
the forfeiture. i Jarman, Wills, 64 (5th ed. Y845), and could be either
grantor or grantee, the grant being good as against all persons except the
king. Sheppard, Touchst. (Ames cd. i86), 232.
Statutes similar to the one in the principal case have been enacted in
several American jurisdictions. In re Donnelly, 125 Cal. 411, 58 Pac. 6x
(1899); Greenough v. Wells, 1o Cush. 571 (1852); Avery v. Everett, z1o
N. Y. 317, 18 N. E. 148 (188&).
Though the phraseology of these statutes for all practical purposes has
been the same, the constructions applied thereto have been by no means uniform. It has been held that such a statute merely recites the common
law, and being highly penal in nature, should not be extended by implication; Avery v. Everett, supra; that the civil rights of the criminal are
extinguished, including the right of inheritance; In re Donnelly, supra; and
again the statute has been made to operate as the natural death of the
person so far as it relates to the management or the settlement of his estate;
Gray v. Stewart, 70 Kan. 42-9, 78 Pac. 852 (1904). In all cases, however,
-he --latutory disability continues only during the imprisonment and, if par-
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doned, the convict gains a new credit and capacity. In re Deming, io Johns
(N. Y. T81o).
In the absence of a uniform rule regarding the civil rights qua property
of the convict to which such a statute applies, the view taken by the court
in the principal case seems to be more in keeping with our institutions and
tenures, and the fact that the convict may ultimately be pardoned.
232

TO STOCK 011-)Es.-A promoter, in
CORPORATION-PROMOTERS-]IABI.LIT'
return for money, time and labor expended in the organization of a corporation and property transferred to it. received shares of stock with the
knowledge and assent of all the stockholders. Later, in accordance with a
pre-arranged plan, other stock was sold to the public. The plaintiff, a subsequent stockholder, brings this action to cancel the issue to the promoter.
Relief was denied. Metcalfe et at. v. Mental Science Industrial Assn'n ct al.,
220 Pac. I (Wash. 1923).
A promoter occupies a fiduciary relationship toward a proposed corporation. Bagnall v. Carlton. 6 Ch. D. 371 (Eng. 1875) ; Chandler v. Bacon
et aL, 30 Fed. 538 (C. C. 1887) ; Groel v. United Electric Co. of N. J. et al.,
Consequently when he sells the prop70 N. J. Eq. 616, 6t Atl. io6 (9o5).
shares of stock, it is his duty to
or
cash
either
receiving
return
in
erty,
acquaint the directors and stockholders with all the facts of the transaction. If he fails to make such di.,closure, he has committed a breach of
duty and is liable to the corporation. Simmons v. Vulcan Oil & Mining
Co., 61 Pa. 2o2 (1869) ; Pittsburgh Mining Co. v. Spooner et a/.. 74 Wis. 307,
42 N. W. 259 (i889); Davis v. Las Ovas Co., Inc., 227 U. S. 80 (1913).
Frequently promoters create a corporation with themselves as directors
or with "dummy" .directors. Although an early English case decided that
it was the duty of the promoters to provide an independent board of dir'etors who should have knowledge of all the facts. Erlanger v. New Sombrero Phosphate Co.. L. R. 3 A. C. 1218 (Fng. 1878). other cases have
sanctioned a board composed of the promoters, if the same wa. created in
good faith. McCracken v. Robinson, 57 Fed. 375 (C. C. A. tf)38 ; .\ttorney
The
General for Canada v. Standard Trust Co., A. C. 498 (Eng. 1911).
Erlanger case started a great controversy in America as to whether the
corporation, suing for subseqtuent innocent stockholders. had an action
against a promoter who had sold property to the corporation at an overvaluation. The United States Supreme Court in Old Dominion Copper Co.
v. Lewisohn, 210 U. S. 206 (t9o6), refused to grant relief to the corporation suing for subsequent innocent stockholders upon the ground that at
the time of the transaction the facts were known by all the membtlwr. of
the corporation. But England and the majority of the Atne'rican states
grant relief to the corporation if its directors or members at the time of
the sale by the promoter intended to sell stock to the public later. Gluckstein v. Barnes, A. C. 240 (Eng. igoo); Old Dominion Copper Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. Y59, 89 N. E. 193 (itor)) ; Pittsburgh Mining Co v. Spooner
et al., supra. The latter rule seems to be preferable. See 58 U. oF PA. L.
Under that rule, if there was no intention at the time of the
Hiv. 226.
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transaction to sell stock later, the promoters are not responsible to stockholders who have been abld to buy because of a subsequent issuance of
stock. In re British Seamless Paper Box Co., 17 Ch. D. 467 (Eng. i881).
In the principal case the action was brought by a subsequent stockholder, and not by the corporation, which was joined as defendant. Most
jurisdictions have allowed stockholders to recover a promoter's secret profits.
The string usually attached to such a suit in equity is that the stockholder
shall have first asked the corporation to sue and have been refused or that
the facts he such that only a refusal could follow the request. Groel v.
United Electric Co. of N. J. el al., supra: Burbank v. Dennis el at., jor Cal.
90, 35 Pac. 444 (1&)4); Wills v. Nehalem Coal Co., 52 Ore. 7o, 96 Pac. 528
Under facts similar to those in the principal case those courts
(irgo8).
which have allowed a corporation to recover show a tendency to allow the
stockholder to recover. Pietsch et a/. v. Milbrath et al.. 123 Wis. 647, 1o
The state which decided the principal case, having
N. XV. 380 (10o5).
adopted the view of the Lewisohn case which denied recovery to the corporation, refused to grant a stockholder relief, citing the cases in which
the action was brought by a corporation as precedents This raises the question whether those states which adopt the Lewisohn case must necessarily
deny relief to a stockholder. Justice F-lolmes in the Lewisohn case intimated that a contrary result might have followed had the stockholder sued.
This dictum was followed in Mason el al. v. Carrothers el al., 1o5 Me. 3!2,
The court in allowing the stockholder to recover said
74 At. 1o3i (9o09).
it was not necessary to choose between the Lewisohn and Bigelow cases.
But even though a suit by a stockholder ought to be decided on a different
theory than a suit by a corporation, it is submitted that the principal case
is correct, since it was not proved to the satisfaction of the court that the
promoter sold his property and services to the corporation at an overx aluation.
CRIzMN.AL LAw-Acts iN WM-:v-'sE OF OTIIIRS-M1STANE OF FAC-r.-The
defendant intervened in a fight to protect his brother, whose life was apparently in danger. and was indicted for a.sault with intent to kill. Held:
the defendant could not justify his attack, since the brother had been the
aggressor in the fight. Moore Ty. Slate, 218 Pac. 1io2 (Okla. 1923).
The general rule is laid down in a number of cases that one who intervenes in behalf of another who is engaged in a quarrel and commits an assault, will not be allowed the benefit of a plea of self-defense,
or of defending another, unless the plea would have been available to the
person aided at that time. Utterback v. Commonwealth, io5 Ky. 723, 49
S. W. 479 (1899) ; Cooper v. State, 123 Tenn. 135, 138 S. W. 852 (1909).
The application of this rule is clear where the party intervening has witnessed the affair from the beginning. There, because of his knowledge of
the circumstances, his act is justifiable to the same degree as the same act
f done by the person aided would have been justifiable as self-defense.
Thus, if the par
late v. Turner, ;46 Mo. 598, 152 S. W. 313 (1912).
a led has been .the aggressor, the party intervening will not he excused;
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Cooper v. State, supra; Utterback v. Commonwealth, supra; unless the person aided has previously regained his right of self-defense by withdr wing
from the conflict. State v. Greer, 22 IV. Va. 819 (1,83) ; State v. Mounkes,
88 Kan. 193, 127 Pac. 637 (19T2).
The fact that the party intervening was
free from fault in bringing on the original quarrel is immaterial. Karr v.
State, io6 Ala. I, 17 So. 328 (1894).
The instant case goes much farther than any of the preceding cases.
Under its rule, it is immaterial that the defendant did not witness the beginning of the quarrel, and when he intervened was unaware of any fault
of the party aided in beginning it. The intervenor's lack of knowledge does
not aid in justification of his act. His right to defend the other is the same
as, and under no circumstances is it greater than, the right of the aided
person to defend himself. He who intervenes does so at his peril. This
view is supported by Wood v. State, 128 Ala. 27, 29 So. 557 (igoo), and
by State v. Cook, 78 S. C. 253, 59 S. E. 862 (1907).
It is submitted that this view is wrong, rince it fails to admit of
a defense based on a mistake of fact. Undtnhtedly one may interfere to
prevent a felony. And, if coming upon two others fighting, a person sees
one of them in apparently grave danger, and he knows of no fault whici
would deprive the endangered one of his right of self-defense, he should
be allowed to intervene, and be excused from the results of the intervention, even if the person aided was the original aggressor. It is a clear 'case
of honest and reasonable mistake of fact. See Mayhew v. State, 65 Tex. Cr.
419, 98 S. W. 269 (i'O6) ; Warnock v. State, 3 Ga. App. 590, 6o S. E. 288
(t9o7); State v. Harper, 149 Mo. 514. i S. W. A9 (189). The liability
of one who acts in defense of another .;!'.duld be measured by the intent with
which he acted, and not by the intent cf the other, tmlegs he knew or might
reasonably have known the intent of the other. Mayhew v. State, supra.
F.QmITY-IsJuNC'NTio-RESTRAINT OF AN ActTION AT IL .- One inhured
by a policy which became incontestable after one year died, and, before expiration of the year, the insurer brought suit in equity in a Federal court for
the cancellation of the policy on the ground of fraud. Later, also within
the year, the beneficiary commenced an action at law on the policy in a state
court, which the insurer moved into the Federal court. The beneficiary was'
enjoined from bringing the action at law. (One dissent.) Jefferson Life
Ins. Co. v. Keeton, 292 Fed. 53 (1923).
If both equity and law will take cognizance of a case, the plaintiff may
proceed in either. In such cases of concurrent jurisdiction it is in the discretion of the chancellor whether or not he will assume jurisdiction. Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U. S. 146 (1891) ; Wehrman v. Conklin, 155 U. S. 314
(1P94)- It is generally stated that, if the remedy at law is doubtful, inadequate or incomplete, equity will take jurisdiction even thoaigh a right .at law
exists. Wagner v. Fehr, 2it Pa. 435, 6o Atd. io43 (igo5). If equity assumes
jurisdiction it is because the legal remedy is not adequate, and this is a sufficient reason for a court of equity to restrain an action at law, instituted
thcrtafter. Imperial Fire Ins. Co. v. Gunning, 8t II!. 236 (1876).
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In both Federal and state courts, when a court of equity ascumes jurisdiction of a controversy before a court of law has done so,. and is able to give
full relief, it may enjoin any other proceedings in the courts of the same
jurisdiction, pertaining to the matters before it. Gainty v. Saul, 82 Md. 459,
33 At. 539 (1895); Berliner Gramophone Co. v. Seaman, 113 Fed. 75o. 51
C. C. A. 446 (19o2). Especially is this true, if justice requires that some
affirmative equitable relief should be given, such as the cancellation of an
instrument on which suit is pending. Henwood v. Jarvis, 27 N. J. Eq. 247
(1876); Whitcomb v. Schultz, 223 Fed. 268, 13 C. C. A. 5io (1915).
Section 723, U. S. Rev. Stat., provides that courts of equity shall not
take jurisdiction when there is an adequate remedy at law. Its intended
effect was only to emphasize the necessity for preserving to litigants in the
Federal courts the right to a jury trial, secured by the Seventh Amendment
to the Constitution, when there was an adequate remedy at law." Grether v.
Wright, 75 Fed. 742, 23 C. C. A. 498 (1896); Warmouth v. O'Daniel, 159
Fed. 87, 86 C. C. A. 277 (908).

In the principal case, the chancellor had sufficient grounds to assume
jurisdiction of the bill in equity for cancellation of the policy. In the dissenting opinion, cognizance was not taken of the fact that the equitable action
would provide a complete remedy, whereas the action at law might not, which
in itself makes the Federal statute inapplicable.
EvDENcE-ABoRTIoN-ADMISSIBILITx oF DYING DECtARATroNs.-Accused
was indicted under.Indiana Rev. St. 1881, Sec. 1923 for procuring an abortion
with death of the woman resulting. The above statute reads: whoever pr6cures an abortion shall "if the woman miscarries or dies" be fined, etc....
The state offered in evidence the dying declarations of the victim. Held:
They were admissible. Hill v. State, 141 N. E. 639 (Indiana 1923).
However arbitrary it may seem, the general rule is that dying declarations are only admissible as evidence in prosecutions where the death of the
dclarant is the "subject of the charge." Wigmore (- ed.) Sec. 1432; Johnson v. State, 47 Ala. 9 (187) ; State v. Bohan, is Kans. 407 (1875). Hence
in a prosecution for simple abortion such declarations are clearly not admissible. Com. v. Homer, 153 Mass. 343, 26 N. E. 872 (189I). But if the
prosecution is for the death resulting (manslaughter or murder), aliter, State
v. Baldwin, 79 Iowa 714, 45 N. W. r297(i89o); Worthington v. State, 92 Md.
222, 48 Ad. 355 (ipoo); State v. Fuller, 52 Ore. 42, 96 Pac. 456 (19o8). Several states now have statutes making these declarations admissible in abortion cases generally. Mass. Laws i899, c. iop;.New York Laws 1875, c.
352; Pa. Laws i8g, 387.
Where there is a special statute providing for punishment of abortions
with death resulting, it is universally held that the offense is taken out of
the common law rules and must be punished on indictment under the statute.
Robbins v. State, 8 Ohio St. 138 (1857) ; Com. v. Jackson, 15 Gray 187 (Mass.
i86o); Montgomery v. State, '8o Ind. 338 (i88i). Although death may
result, the indictment-must be under the statute and not for manslaughter.
Montgomery v. State, supra. It would seem logical, therefore, that, if
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death has lben made an essential ingredient or element of the crime, the
declarations should be admitted. The death must be averred and proved;
it is the subject of judicial investigation although the statute may have given
the offense another name. And it should be of no consequence that the accused is exposed to the danger of having these declarations put in evidence
and then having them used to convict of simple abortion when death is not
proved to be the result of his act. Com. v. Keene, 7 Pa. Super. 293 (1898);
State v. Meyer, 65 N. J. L. 237, 47 AtI. 486 (igoo). The difficulty arises in
determining whether or not a particular statute does or does not make death
a necessary element of the offense it punishes. Of course, if the statute
specifically terms the crime manslaughter, there is no doubt. People v. Lonsdale, 122 Mich. 388, 8i- N. W. 277 (1899); People v. Hagenow, :236 II. s14,
86 N. E. 370 (i9o8). The Indiana statute (involved in the principal case)
has been construed to make death an essential element. Montgomery v. State,
supra; and see State v. Meyer, supra. But similar statutes have been otherwise construed, on the ground that the crime is complete with or without
death, or miscarriage, and that these results only increase the punishment.
People v. Davis, 56 N. Y. 95 (1874); State v. Harper, 35 Ohio St. 78 (1878);
Railing v. Com., iio Pa. ioo, i At. 314 (1885). It would seem that the
Indiana interpretation is more in accord with advanced legal reasoning and
policy
HUSBAND AND WIFE--ESTATE BY ENTiriFs-PESoNALTy.--Husband
and wife conveyed land, taking as part payment certain bonds executed in
both names. Upon death of husband, the wife claimed the entire property
in the bonds as survivor, on the ground that there had existed an estate by
the entireties. Husband's administrator sues to recover one-half the amount
of the bonds. Held: for the administrator. The bonds had been held as
tenants in common. Turlington v. Lucas, 1i 9 S. E. 366 (N. C. 1923).
At common law all the personal property of the wife in possession
vested absolutely in her husband, and, upon his death, passed to his personal
representatives. He could bring action also to reduce to possession her
choses in action, and it was only when he died -without having done this
that they survived to the wife. Blackstone Corn. (Lewis' Ed.) vol. II, sec.
434.
There is authority for the proposition that estates by the entireties in
personalty did exist at common law. See Jickling's Anal. L & Eq. Estates,
257, citing the cases of Cowper v. Scott, 3 P. Wins. 121, and Temple v.
Temple, Cro. Eliz. 791.
The text-writers are not in harmony on this point. Bishop in his work
on the "Law of Married Women" (vol. 1, sec. 21),
denies that such an
estate existed; but his position is sharply criticized in Freeman's "Contenancy
ard Partition" (2d Ed., sec. 68), and in an article in i8 Am. Dec. 371.
When one considers the extreme disabilities under which a married
woman labored at common law as regards her personal property, it is difficult to understand how an estate by the entireties could exist as to chattels;
'and if such an estate did exist as to choses in action, it was at best a very
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imperfect one, only rising to importance.whcn the husband died without having reduced them to possession. See note in 22 L. R. A. $94.
While there is great diversity among the courts, the numerical weight of
authority probably upholds the view that an estate by entireties in personalty
does exist. 30 C. J. 574, sec. io7. Armong this group, Pennsylvania stands
in the forefront. Sloan's Estate, 254 Pa. 346 (916). On facts exactly similar to those in the principal case, a directly opposite result was reached in
Bramberry's Estate, 156 Pa. 6-8 (1893):
This doctrine is also adhered to in other jurisdictions, and has been applied to shares of stock (Phelps v. Simons, i59 Mass. 415, 1893); to an annuity (Ward v. Ward, L R. 14 Ch. Div. so6, i88o); savings bank deposit
(Baker v. Smith, 123 Md. 32, 1914). See also Smith v. Hare, 133 Tenn. 343
(igi5), where the wife was permitted to take as survivor on the theory that,
all the consideration having been paid by the husband, a gift to her would be
implied.
The view taken in the principal case, namely, that the estate is one of tenency in common, in the absence of a contrary agreement, and that no estate
by the entireties in personalty can exist, obtained in Waite v. Bovee, 35 Mich.
425 (1877); Matter of Albrecht, 136 N. Y. 91 (i89z) ; In re Berry, 247 Fed.
The modern tendency is undoubtedly against estates by the entireties. In
some 'jurisdictions, their applicability to real property has been denied, as opposed to considerations of public policy. Whittlesey v. Fuller, ii Conn. 34o
(1836); Hoffman v. Stigers, 28 Iowa 302 (1869).
There seems to be no good reason for holding such an estate exists as
to personalty.

As has been shown, it is highly problematic whether, as a

practical thing, it existed at common law. The "Married Women's Property Acts" have tended more and more to sever the legal personality of the
wife from that of her husband. As to the extent to which this has been
done, see Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, i98 Ill. App. 442 (i916). In so doing,
they have removed the only reason for such estates, namely, the legal unity
of husband and wife. On this ground, it is submitted the decision in the
principal case represents the better view.
MANDAMUS-STOCKiOLDERS' RIGHTS-INSPECTON OF CORPORATE BOOKS AND
REcoRDsi.--To a petition for a writ a mandamus for an inspection of the corporate list of stockholders in order to obtain proxies for a coming election,
the directors pleaded that the petition was defective in that it charged no
mismanagement of the corporation. Held: The plea was demurrable and a
writ of mandamus should issue. Hauser et al. v. York Water Co., Supreme
Court of Pa., No. 333, January Term, 1923 (not yet reported).. :.
At common law a stockholder had the right to inspect the books, papers
and records of his corporation at a reasonable time and for a proper purpose. Stone v. Kellogg, 16, 111. 192, 46 N. -. 222 (1897) ; Bruning v. Hobokern Print. Co., 67 N. J. L- xi9, s Att. 9o6 (i9o3) ; In re Steinway, x59 '.
Y. 250, 53 N. E. 11o3 (899).
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In many of the states the statutes give stockholders the same right. It
is sometimes said of these statutes that they are merely declaratory of the
common law. Guthrie v. Harkness, igg U. S. 148 (19o5). It is generally
conceded, however, that they materially enlarge and extend the common law
rule and do, not simply affirm it. Cobb v. Lagarde, r29 Ala. 488, 30 So. 326
(19oo); Johnson v. Langdon, 135 Cal. 624, 67 Pac. 1050 (1902).

The English courts hold that some dispute or controversy must have
arisen, with reference to which the right of inspection is sought, before such
right will be enforced.

See Rex v. Tailors Co., 2 Barn. & Adol. ii5 (Eng.

1831). This doctrine, however, is generally repudiated in this country. State
v. Pacific Brewing Co., 21 Wash. 451. 58 Pac. 584 (1899) ; Foster v. White,
86 Ala. 467, 6 So. 88 (x888).
The courts in the exercise of sound discretion will not grant the writ

to aid speculative purposes or blackmail or to gratify mere curiosity. Guthrie v. Harkness, supra; but the burden of showing the stockholders' pur-

the corporation. State v. Pacific
pose improper is upon the directors ofsupra.
Brewing Co., supra; Stone v. Kellogg,
It is not necessary, however, to allege that the officers in charge of the
corporation have been guilty of fraud or mismanagement.

Wyoming Coal

Min. Co. v. State, 15 Wyo. 98, 87 Pac. 337 (i9o6).
The principal case is interesting because of the fact that it expressly
overrules the case of Com. v. Empire Passenger Railway Co., 734 Pa. 237

(i89o), which followed the English view.
ROBBERY-PROPERTY THE SUBJECT Or-MONEY Wox AT GAMBLING.At the

conclusion of a fairly played game, the loser voluntarily paid to the winner
the amount won. Shortly afterwards he retook the same by force and violence. A conviction of robbery was reversed (one dissent) because of the
following instruction: "If the loser at cards voluntarily pays the winner, the
winner owns the money and a retaking may be robbery." State v. Price,
219 Pac. 1094 (Idaho 1923);
The instruction was held error on the ground that a winner in a gambling
game never gains a valid title to the money. If this premise is correct, the

result cannot be questioned, since a man cannot be guilty of larceny or rob,bery in retaking property to which he has both title and right of possession.
Winfrey v. State, 84 Tex. Cr. 579, 29 S. W. 151 (1919); Barnhardt v. State,
Ind. 177, 56 N. F. 212 (19o).
The fact that property is illegally acquired or used does not prevent it
from being the subject of larceny or robbery; proceeds of.illegal sale, Corn.
v. Rourke, IO Cush. 397 (Mass. 1852); gaming implements, State v. Wilmore,
9 Ohio Dec. Rep. 6i (1898); but cf. Bales v. State, 3 W. Va. 685 (868);
whiskey, Statel v. Schoonover, 211 Pac. 756 (Wash. 1922); but cf. People v.
Spencer, 54 Cal. AtI. 54, 2oi Pac. 130 (192i). When the loser in a gambling
game voluntarily pays the winner, title passes and he cannot retake the money
in a civil action. See v. Runzi, io5 Mo. App. 435, 79 S. W. 992 (904);
Schlosser v. Smith, 93 Ind. 83 (883); Davies v. Porter, 248 Fed. 397
(igi8). Many states have statutes allowing recovery; Adams v. Dick, 226
15
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Mass. 46, ii5 N. E. 227 (1917); Watts v. Lynch, 62 N. H. 96, 5 Atl. 458
(108-6) ; Pelt v. Schauble, 68 N. J. L. 638, 54 Atl. 437 (19o3); but the right
arises properly only from statute. Mozorosky v. Hurllijrt, 211 Pac. 893 (Ore.
1923); Robinson v. Marsh, 2 K. B.-64o (1921). The presence of fraud in
the game causes some courts to hold, even without statute, that no title
passes. Lockman v. Cobb, 77 Ark. 279, 9i S. W. 546 (19o5); Webb v. Fulchire, 3 Ire. 485 (N. C. 1843); but cf. Babcock v. Thompson, 3 Pick. 446
(Mass. 1826); Bannon v. Hennessy, 281 Fed. 193 (1922). Hence, where
there is no statute involved, title would pass ;nd there would be robbery;
Blain v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. 448, 31 S.W. 368 (1895) ; Coker v. State, 71 Tex.
Cr. 504, i6o S. W'.366 (r913); although if there was fraud aliter. Temple
v. State, 86 Tex. Cr. 219, 215 S. W. 965 (1919). Where by statute no
title passed, no robbery was committed. Sikes v. State, 17 Ky. L R. 1353,
34 S. W. 902; People v. Henry, 202 Mich. 450, 168 N. W. 534" (1918). It
would seem, therefore, that in Idaho, where there is no statute on the subject, title should pass. Hence, the premise of the court seems unwarranted,
and the result unsound.
STATUTES-CoNsTRucToI\-NO-EXISTFNT
INTsNT.-The island of St.
Croix was ceded by Denmark to the United States by treaty in 1917. By Act
of Congress, March 3, 1917, local tax laws were continued in force. Among
such laws was one providing for an inheritance tax, with an exemption for
"pensions." Ordinance of Denmark and Norway of September 12, 1792, sec.
2, sub-sec. c.
The local government, authorized by the same Act of Congress, enacted a Code which created dower, theretofore unknown to tlie
local law. Compiled Code for St. Croix, title II, chap. II, sec. r. The administrator of an intestate estate petitions for adjudication of the question
of inheritance tax on the widow's dower. Held: dower is exempt as a "pension.' In re Estate of Hansen, Dist. Court of the Virgin Islands, SubJudicial Dist. No. 26 (1923).
When, by cession or otherwise, countries have been acquired by the
United States, the laws which have prevailed there up to the time of such
acquisition are no longer the laws of a foreign government, but of an antecedent government, and as such are judicially noticed by the courts; so, in
suits prosecuted after acquisition, of which the cause of action arose before acquisition, American courts have been called on to decide questions of
foreign law, which has become domestic law; as, English; Davis.v. Curry,
5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 238 (18io); Stokes v. Macken, 62 Barb. 145 (N. Y. 1861);
French; Chouteau v. Pierre, 9 Mo. 3 (845), serb!e; Spanish; U. S. v. Baltimore, 98 U. S.424 (1878); Wells v. Stout, 9 Cal. 479 (1858); Ott v. Soulard, 9 Mo. 573 (1845); Mexican; Ely's Ad. v. U. S., 171 U. S. zo (1898);
U. S. v. Chaves, 159 U. S. 45z (1895).; State v. Sais, 47 Tex. 307 (1877);
Russian; Callsen v. Hope, 75 Fed. 758 (1896).
In case of such acquisition, certain laws of the acquired county continue in force until changed by the acquiring country; Halleck, Int. Law, Ch.
34, sec. 14 (igog); Keith, Theory of State Succession 79 (1907); Ely's Ad.
v. U. S., supra; or as in the instant case it may be stiecifically provided that
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certain laws shall continue; Amer. Ins. Co. v. Canter, _6 U. S. 51i (1828);
Ponce v. Roman Catholic Church, 21o U. S. 296 (igo8); Barnett v. Barnett,
9 N. Mex. 205, 50 Pac. 337 (1897) ; and here, the cause of action arising
after acquisition, the courts decide questions of previously foreign law which
is not simply adopted in retrospect, but is now truly domestic. The present
case is an interesting example of this, in which there is a joinder of alien
systems of law, and a resultant problem of the construction of a hypothetical
intent, i. e., what would the Danish lawgiver have -intended, had he known
of such a thing as dower? For interpretation of non-existent intent, see
33 HARV. L. R v.587.
Gray, Nature and Sources of the Law, 173 (i2);
Applying the Danish method of reasoning by analogy, and' Danish precedents in which annuities and testamentary life estates were held "pensions";
°
Andrup, Arveafgiften efter Dansk. Ret. 73 (1873) ; Skrivelse No. 2o6 af i9
Februar 1895 fra Guvernmentet til Prokurator Jorgensen, St. Thoanis
Byfogedkontor's Normal Bog, 231; the court reached the satisfactory conclusion that a life estate acquired by virtue of intestate laws was also a
.(pension:'

SURErYSHIP-WIFE AS SuRETY FoR HusBAmN-EsToPrpi-The defendant
signed notes "as principal" jointly with her husband and a third party. The
jury found that the defendant signed the notes solely as surety for.the debts
of her husband. The plaintiff, the payee, contended that the defendant was
not relieved from liability in spite of a state statute prohibiting a wife from
becoming a surety for her husband, and that she was estopped from claimi'ig that she was a surety. Held: (two dissents) for the plaintiff. Barton
122 Adt. 582 (Vt. i93).
Sazvzgs Bank & Trust Co. v. Bickford et at.,
At common law, a married woman could not become a surety for her
husband, because of her contractual disability. Swing v. Woodruff, 41 N. J.
L. 469 (1879). In most of the states, modem statutes have given effect to
the common law rule. Perkins v. Elliott, 23 N. J.Eq. 526 (i872); Manor
Nat'l Bank v. Lowery, 242 Pa. 559, 89 AtL 678 (i914).
In ascertaining the legal obligation of the wife, it is generally held that
the court is not governed by the form but by the substance of the relationship into which she has entered. As a result, although she has signed a note
as one of the principals, if the courts find that she did not receive the benefits of the consideration, but was only acting as surety for her husband, they
will relieve her of liability. Lucas v. Nagedom, i58 Ky. 39, 164 S. W.
978 (1914) ; First Nat'l Bank v. Rutter, 91 N. J. . 424, io4 At. 138 (i918).
The plaintiff has usually attempted to ground his right of action on
estoppel, when confronted with the defendant's statutory defense. In some
jurisdictions, the courts lay down the rule that a married woman's contract
as surety cannot be validated by the doctrine of estoppel, because it is void.
Richardson v. Stephens, 122 Ala. 3oi, 25 So. 39 (i898) ; Knoblock v. Posey,
Other courts adhere strictly to the doctrine
126 La. 61o, s2 So. 847 (i910).
of estoppel and hold that she may estop; herself by the form of the contract.
In these decisions, it is usually pointed out that the plaintiff did not knciw
that the wife was only a surety, but relied on her representation to his detri-
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ment. This is obviously an cxceptiun to the parol evidence rule. Shirk v.
North, 38 Ind. 210, 37 N. . 590 (1893) ; Hackettstown Nat'l Bank v. Ming,
5a N. J. Eq. x56, -7 AtI. 920 (1893); Chemical Natl. Bank v. Kellogg, 183
N. Y. 92, 75 N. E io3 (igo5). It obviously follows that no estoppel can be
maintained if the plaintiff, knowing the truth, did not rely on the representation, for in such a case he participated in the attempt to evade the statute.
Continental Bank v. Clark, 117 Ala. 292, 22 So. 988 (i8g8); Crumbaugh v.
Postell, 2o Ky. L. R. 1366, 49 S. W. 334.0899); Weil v. Waterhouse, 46
Ind. App. 690, 91 N. E. 746 (igio).
In the principal case, the majority of the court decides that parol evidence should not be admitted to vary the instrument, and that the defendant
is estopped to assert her defense, even though the plaintiff knew that she was
acting as a surety. It seems that the minority opinion is the more logical.
Incapacity is usually a defense unless an equitable estoppel, as "in this case,
intervenes; moreover, it was not proved that the plaintiff acted without knowledge of defendant's position as a surety, which proof seems essential to the
establishment of an estoppel. Nott v. Thomson, 35 S. C. 461, 14 S. E. 940
(i89i); Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Behnoke, 41 Ind. App. 288, 81 N. E.
i19 (1907); First Nat'l Bank v. Rutter, supra.

TORTSuRvivAL

or ACTION-NEGLIGENcE

OF

BENEFICIARIES AS

A DE-

FENsE.-Plaintiff sues as administrator of his deceased wife, on behalf of
himself and five adult children. The deceased came to her death while riding in an automobile with the plaintiff through the combined negligence of
the defendant and the plaintiff. Held (one dissent): for the defendant. The
contributory negligence of one beneficiary is a complete defense to the action.
Hacel v. Hoopcston-DanvilleMotor Bus Company, 141 N. . 392 (111. 1923).
At common law, under the maxim "actio personalis moritur cum persona," no civil action for causing death could have been brought. 17 C J.
118i, sec. 36. In practically all jurisdictions in this country this situation
has been remedied by statutes which either create a new cause of action,
conditioned upon the right of deceased to have brought an action if living;
or provide that the old cause of action .which the deceased would have had,had death not ensued, shall survive. For analytical outline of these statutes
in the various states see Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act (2d ed.), pages
Xix-lxxi.
Where the sole beneficiary or all the beneficiaries are guilty of negligence
contributing to the death of the deceased, the general view in those
states which have created new causes of ,action is that recovery will
not be allowed, the reason being that no one can benefit by his own negligence. The Chicago City Railway Co. v. Wilcox, 138 Ill. 370 (890;
Bamberger v. Citizens' Street Railway Co, 95 Tenn.' i8 (1895); Rapaport v.
Pittsburgh Railway Co., 247 Pa. 347 (1915). Under survival statutes, however, it seems the negligence of beneficiaries in no way affects the statutory
action. Wigmore v. Mahoska County, 78 Iowa 396 (1$89); Nashville Lur.
ber Co. v. Busbee, 1-39 S. W. 301 (Ark. 1911). The. same view has been
adopted in New York, under a statute creating a new. caiuse of action, on
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the ground that the rule of contributory negligence of other persons than the
deceased has no application to the statutory action. McKay, Adm., v. Syracuse Rapid Transit Railway Co., 208 N. Y. 359 (1913).
Where some of the beneficiaries but not all are negligent, the result
in the principal case is against the weight of 'authority and. has little to
commend it. See 23 A. L R. 69o and cases cited. It is neither logical nor
equitable to penalize those entitled to damages because one or some of the
beneficiaries are negligent. The -action is brought as much for the benefit of
those beneficiaries free of negligence as for those who, because of negligence, have forfeited their right to recovery. Phillips v. Denver City
Tramway Co., 53 Coo. 458 (1912); Kokesh v. Price, 136 Minn. 304 (1917).
Under a statute very similar to the one in Illinois, it was held that the
jury, in assessing damages, should consider only the injury to such beneficiaries as were not negligent, and the amount of damages returned should
be divided among them solely. Wolf v. The Lake Erie & Western Railway Co., 55 Ohio St. 51Y (i896). This procedure would overcome the
objection in the mind of the court in the principal case to apportioning the
damages under a statute providing that the jury shall find damages in one
lump sum. For a discussion of this phase of the subject, see Tiffany,
Death by Wrongful Act (2d ed.), sec. 72.
In arriving at its decision, the court, in the principal case, ignored
completely the earlier cases of Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co. v. Leavitt,
iog Ill. App. 385 (i9o3); and Chicago City Railway Co. v. McKean, r43
I11. App. 598 (i9o8), in both of which cases it was held that the negligence
of one beneficiary would not affect the rights of others not negligent. The
law of these cases has much to commend it, and the instant decision seems
unsound.
Cases in accord with the principal case are Vinnette v. Northern Pacific
Railway Company, 47 Wash. 320 (I9O7); Darbinsky v. Pennsylvania Co.,
248 Pa. 503 (9I5).

